The U.S. Supreme Court has given a unanimous鈥攂ut, for now, partial鈥攙ictory to a family that sued a Michigan school district under federal disabilities laws after the district barred a service dog for a child with cerebral palsy.
In Fry v. Napoleon Community Schools (Case No. 15-497), the high court held that a student or family suing a school district over a disability-related issue does not always have to go through, or 鈥渆xhaust,鈥� all the procedures under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act before going to court.
The court held that IDEA procedures need not be exhausted when the essence, or 鈥済ravamen,鈥� of a lawsuit centers on a violation of other federal disabilities law rather than the special education law鈥檚 core guarantee of a 鈥渇ree, appropriate special education.鈥�
鈥淚f, in a suit brought under a different statute, the remedy sought is not for the denial of a FAPE, then exhaustion of the IDEA鈥檚 procedures is not required,鈥� Justice Elena Kagan wrote in an opinion for the court.
The case involved Ehlena Fry, a Michigan student who was denied the use of her service dog by her former district, the Napoleon Community Schools. Kagan said a federal appeals court did not undertake the proper analysis of whether the suit was mainly about special education or essentially about vindicating the child鈥檚 rights under the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 or the Rehabilitation Act of 1973.
Kagan suggested that it was more likely the latter since Fry was seeking to use her service dog for better accessibility at school.
鈥淭he Frys鈥� complaint alleges only disability-based discrimination, without making any reference to the adequacy of the special education services E.F.'s school provided,鈥� Kagan wrote.
鈥淥n remand,鈥� Kagan added, 鈥渢he court below should establish whether (or to what extent) the Frys invoked the IDEA鈥檚 dispute-resolution process before bringing this suit. And if the Frys started down that road, the court should decide whether their actions reveal that the gravamen of their complaint is indeed the denial of a FAPE, thus necessitating further exhaustion.鈥�
Stacy Fry, Ehlena鈥檚 mother, said in an interview that she was elated by the decision, especially the 8-0 judgment of the court.
鈥淔or us, it鈥檚 just that no child should have their life put on hold because they choose to be as independent as possible by using a medically prescribed service dog,鈥� she said. 鈥淭his is huge for families going through discrimination. If they鈥檙e not arguing their education, they can avoid the legal drag-out of that.鈥�
鈥楥lose to Total Victory鈥�
Ehlena Fry is now in the 6th grade in the nearby Manchester, Mich., district. She no longer relies on her service dog, a goldendoodle named Wonder, at school. But her family is seeking damages in their disability-discrimination suit, a remedy they could still receive after another round or two of court proceedings.
Michael J. Steinberg, the legal director of the American Civil Liberties Union of Michigan, which represented the Fry family, called the decision 鈥減retty close to total victory,鈥� adding, 鈥淲e feel very good about winning on remand鈥� when the case returns to the lower courts.
The lawyer for the Napoleon district did not immediately respond to a request for comment.
Chief Justice John G. Roberts Jr. and Justices Anthony M. Kennedy, Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Stephen G. Breyer, and Sonia Sotomayor joined Kagan鈥檚 opinion.
Justice Samuel A. Alito Jr. filed an opinion concurring in part and concurring in the judgment, joined by Justice Clarence Thomas. Alito said he objected to some of the 鈥渃lues鈥� that Kagan鈥檚 opinion provided to the lower courts that might handle similar cases.
Kagan stressed that the IDEA guarantees individually tailored educational services, while the ADA and Rehabilitation Act 鈥減romise nondiscriminatory access to public institutions.鈥�
She said 鈥渙ne clue鈥� to whether a suit against a school essentially concerns denial of a free, appropriate public education or disability-based discrimination can come by asking whether the plaintiff could bring the same claim if the alleged conduct had occurred at, say, a public library instead of a school.
And, she said, one could ask whether an adult at a school, such as an employee or a visitor, could bring the same grievance.
鈥淲hen the answer to those questions is yes, a complaint that does not expressly allege the denial of a FAPE is also unlikely to be truly about that subject,鈥� Kagan said. 鈥淎fter all, in those other situations, there is no FAPE obligation, and yet the same basic suit could go forward.鈥�
鈥淏ut when the answer is no,鈥� she wrote, 鈥渢hen the complaint probably does concern a FAPE, even if it does not explicitly say so; for the FAPE requirement is all that explains why only a child in the school setting (not an adult in that setting or a child in some other) has a viable claim.鈥�
Alito declined to join that portion of Kagan鈥檚 opinion, saying in his concurrence that her clues 鈥渁re likely to confuse and lead courts astray.鈥�
